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ORTHODOXY A:ND HERESY
Eleonore Stump

Alvin Plantinga's "Advice to Christian Philosophers" had the effect of getting
contemporary Christian philosophers to recognize themselves as a part of a
community with a worldview different from that found in the rest of Jcademia, and to take seriously in their work their commitment to that distinct
worldview. I argue that in the current climate of opinion, generated at least in
part by Plantinga's advice, it would be worthwhile for contemporary Christian
philosophers to consider that we also belong to a community of Christians that
extends across centuries, and to ask what we are committed to by our participation in that larger community.

In troduction
Alvin Plantinga's "Advice to Christian Philosophers'" had the effect of getting contemporary Christian philosophers to recognize themselves as a
part of a community with a worldview different from that found in the rest
of academia, and to take seriously in their work their commitment to that
distinct worldview. Plantinga's advice generated some controversy when
he first presented it; but, in my view, it has had a very beneficial effect on
philosophy as it is now practiced by Christian philosophers. Many people
took his advice to heart, and the result is noticeable not only in the research
of Christian philosophers in recent years but also more generally in an
increased willingness on the part of Christian philosophers to remember
and reflect on Christian standpoints in the pursuit of all their professional
duties. In the current climate of opinion, generated at least in part by
Plantinga's advice, I think it would be worthwhile for contemporary
Christian philosophers to consider that we also belong to a community of
Christians that extends across centuries, and to ask what we are committed
to by our participation in that larger community.
One of the issues that such reflection raises has to do with the distinction between orthodoxy and heresy.
There is, of course, a problem here. Serious use of the word 'heresy' is
guaranteed to raise anxiety and indignation or even fury.
In Pakistan it is against the law to say things about God that the authorities judge contrary to Islamic orthodoxy. Several years ago, the Pakistani
law made headlines in this country when a fourteen-year old Pakistani boy
was sentenced to death for disobeying that law. The Prime Minister of
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Pakistan at that time, Benazir Bhutto, said that she was shocked at the
boy's predicament, but that she could not interfere with the law. Cases like
this make us feel that focus on orthodoxy is plainly pernicious and that
acceptance of the distinction between orthodoxy and heresy tends only to
promote social injustice.
When we look at religious history, we certainly find ample support for
such a feeling. Among Christians, Catholics have persecuted Protestants,
and Protestants have persecuted Catholics-in each case because the
offending group failed to hold the beliefs that the dominant group took to
be required for orthodoxy. As far as that goes, Protestants have persecuted
other Protestants for heresy-Calvin was instrumental in the burning of
Servetus, for example-and Catholics have fought endlessly among themselves. In the Middle Ages, the seculars fought with the mendicants, the
Dominicans were regularly at odds with the Franciscans, and the
Franciscans themselves were split over the issue of monastic poverty. And,
of course, Christians have no monopoly on persecution in the name of
orthodoxy. Think about the conflicts between Sunni and Shiite Muslims,
for example, or the contemporary conflicts between fundamentalist and
liberal Muslims in north Africa. Devotion to orthodoxy has been a stimulus to violence and oppression, across cultures and times.
We are so far from fighting for orthodoxy in religion in academic circles
now that we are positively embarrassed by the very distinction between
orthodoxy and heresy. We are not surprised that antiquarians-scholars
interested in history just for history'S sake-would take an interest in the
distinction. But apart from antiquarian investigations, we tend to take mention of heresy as a figure of speech at best and as right-wing extremism at
worst. It is still possible, if rare, to hear someone publicly make an accusation of religious heresy, but those who hear the charge are more likely to
wish that the accuser would go away than that the accused would reform.
In fact, many academics, even those with strong religious commitments
of their own, find any attempt to uphold the distinction between orthodoxy and heresy in religion offensive. Someone who wants to distinguish
the orthodox from the heretical seems to be claiming not only to know the
truth but to know it better than her heretical neighbors, whose views she
regards, disrepectfully, as false. Gordon Kaufman speaks for people who
feel this way about the distinction when he says/
the new consciousness of the significance of religious pluralism, the
growing awareness of the way in which all our ideas are shaped by
the cultural and symbolic framework of orientation within which we
are living and thinking, the sensitivity to Christian responsibility for
certain aspects of the massive evils which confront us today ... [all]
tend to promote a deep humility about the religious and philosophical traditions we have inherited and a profound questioning of the
propriety of making dogmatic claims of any sort with regard to their
ultimate "reality" or "truth."3
I do want to take the distinction between orthodoxy and heresy seriously. But in the atmosphere suggested by this quotation, it seems to me a

ORTHODOXY AND HERESY

149

good idea to qualify my thesis about orthodoxy and heresy before I say
what the thesis is and give advice to go with it. In fact, the bulk of this
paper will consist in qualifications; the advice comes in only briefly, at the
end. This is a modest, seemly approach to giving advice.

First Two Qual{fications
Here is the first qualification. Although I am going to take seriously the
notion of heresy, I think the notion of heretic should be discarded for any
purpose other than historical description. That's because a heretic is supposed to be someone who is committed to a heresy and who because of his
heresy is worthy of being thrown out of the community of the orthodox!
But it's a great mistake to suppose that one can make a legitimate inference
from the appropriateness of rejecting a belief to the appropriateness of
rejecting the person who holds that belief. A person might hold a belief
which no reasonable person would consider orthodox, and yet that person
might be someone whom the community of the orthodox should admire
and extol for spiritual excellence.
To see what I mean, consider the story of William Hunter in Foxe's Book
of Martyrs.' I won't tell you what I take Hunter's heresy to be, just in case I
didn't succeed in picking an example of a doctrine which no reasonable
person could take as Christian orthodoxy.6 Use your imagination and pick
some theologica 1 position which in your own view is not only theologically
beyond the pale but philosophically illiterate as well. Imagine that to be
Hunter's heresy, and in my view you won't be far off the mark. But if in
fact you go to the relevant passages of Foxe and find that you don't think
as I do about Hunter, trust me: somewhere in the history of religious persecutions in Britain, there is someone whom you would evaluate as I evaluate Hunter. Feel free to substitute that person for Hunter in this context. In
the same spirit, I should point out that Foxe isn't generally considered the
best authority on the history of martyrs; but if the story he tells isn't accurate in all its details (or even any of them), there is some story just like it
somewhere which is accurate.
According to Foxe, William Hlmter was a nineteen-year old apprentice
during the reign of Queen Mary, who was convicted of heresy by the
Catholic authorities in his region. The authorities gave Hunter every
opportunity and every incentive to recant. The bishop put him in stocks,
imprisoned him, and even tried to bribe him with the offer of a job and a
large sum of money; in the end, the bishop just threatened him with execution if he didn't recant. But the teenager was as oblivious to threats as to
bribery, and he maintained his position steadfastly. When he was finally
condemned to be burned to death as a heretic, he comforted his weeping
mother by telling her, "For the little pain I shall suffer, which shall soon be
at an end, Christ has promised me, mother, a crown of joy. Should you not
be glad of that?" And he was burned to death with the words of the 51 st
Psalm on his lips: "a broken and a contrite heart, 0 God, thou wilt not
despise."7 Perhaps his theology was hopeless; but, as for the man himself,
who among us is worthy to sit next to him?
In my view, then, it is a wretched mistake to judge a person's Christian
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character or his standing with God on the basis of a judgment that some of
his Christian beliefs are not orthodox. 8 As the story from Foxe's Book of
Martyrs shows, a person can hold a belief which is not orthodox and yet be
someone whose Christian excellence is far beyond our own.
Here is the second qualification of the as yet unstated thesis. It's an even
more lamentable mistake to suppose that coercion of any sort should be
used to stamp out unorthodox beliefs.' As the history of attempted repression shows, it is not possible to have a society which uses coercion against
beliefs it wants to eliminate without making that practice known to those
in the society. The result is that, even if (mirabile dictu) the beliefs that society is trying to protect are all true, the coercive practices of that society will
nonetheless undermine love of truth. Those who hold orthodox beliefs will
realize that it is prudent for them to do so, so that whatever love of truth
brings them to orthodox beliefs, their acceptance of those beliefs will also
be motivated by prudential considerations. Those who are undecided
about orthodox beliefs will weigh them with mingled concern for truth
and for their own well-being. And those who pride themselves on their
unwillingness to let prudential considerations motivate their adherence to
religious beliefs will be more inclined to reject than to accept the truth of
orthodox beliefs, because to accept them in such a society is not to seek the
truth but to yield to pressure. Even those who reject orthodoxy, then, will
evaluate orthodox beliefs with some self-regarding concern-for ensuring
their independence of political pressure-and will be more inclined to the
role of rebel than to the seeking of truth. So in virtue of choosing coercive
means to try to protect truth, a society docs serious damage to the love of
truth. This is bound to be a concern for any community, but it's disastrous
for the Christian community.
So those are my first two qualifications of the thesis which I haven't yet
expressed. It's wrong and self-defeating for Christians to judge harshly a
person's standing with God solely because he holds unorthodox beliefs or
to bring any political pressure on such a person to change his views. There
is actually one more qualification important for my purposes here, but I'd
like to put it in the more usual place, after the statement of the thesis it
qualifies. I hope that these two qualifications relieve enough of the anxiety
generated by taking seriously the distinction between orthodoxy and
heresy that we can now tum to the nature of the distinction itself. After
that, I'll say what my thesis is.

One more preliminary point
There are lots of questions raised for Christians by the distinction
between orthodoxy and heresy. For example, how does one decide which
beliefs count as orthodox for Christians? If one came to hold beliefs supposed on some grounds to be orthodox, how would one be justified in the
higher-order belief that those grounds were the right ones? Or, again, is
Christian orthodoxy compromised by accomodation with local nonChristian religions, such as that exemplified by the Jesuit missionary
Matteo Ricci in 16th-century China?lO As far as that goes, what are we to
think about Christendom's past missionary efforts? Without missionary
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concern that religiously orthodox beliefs be shared by people everyvvhere,
would the west African slave trade, for example, have prospered as it did
in the early modern period?l1 What is the relation between orthodoxy and
political domination of marginal groups? Has orthodoxy been used as an
excuse for oppressing women or people of other races and ethnic groups?
All of these are good questions; all of them are questions that interest me.
But none of these questions is at issue in what I want to talk about here.
I want to talk about something that is preliminary to all these questions,
namely, the very distinction between orthodoxy and heresy. Furthermore,
it is clear that upholding the legitimacy of the distinction is compatible
with very different answers to the questions I mean to leave to one side.
Tomas de Torquemada and Matteo Ricci, for example, both cared deeply
about Christian orthodoxy. But Torquemada's care for orthodoxy brought
it about that at least two thousand people were killed for their unorthodox
beliefs and 160,000 Jews were expelled from their homes, while Ricci's care
for orthodoxy was such that even now, among Communist Chinese in the
academy, his name is a symbol of tolerance and respect for other cultures.

Orthodoxy as right beliefs
So what is the distinction between orthodoxy and heresy? There are, in
fact, two ways to take this question, internally, from within a particular
religious perspective, and externally, from the perspective of an outsider.
For a Muslim, for example, orthodox Muslim beliefs must be true beliefs.
Jews also, however, can recognize that some Muslim beliefs are orthodox
and others are heretical. To do so, the Jew need not grant that orthodox
Muslim beliefs are true; he needs to grant only that they are taken to be
true by orthodox Muslims.
But to speak of orthodoxy from within a religious tradition requires
accepting that some religious beliefs are true and others are not. Disputes
about the legitimacy of the notion of orthodoxy are therefore connected to
certain theological disputes about rea lism and irrealism with regard to the
claims of a religion. For example, in a recent paper, "Realism and the
Christian Faith," William Alston argues that George Santayana, Paul
Tillich, and John Hick are all irrealists as far as religion goes and would
reject the claim that some and only some religious beliefs are true." If we as
adherents to a religious tradition take some religious beliefs to be orthodox, then we will have to reject this position of these theologiansY We will
have to hold that there is a fact of the matter in the realm of religion, and
that religious statements have a truth-value. In that case, given the diverse
and incompatible set of religious statements, some of the religious statements human beings have made will be true and others will not; not all
religious beliefs will be right.

Orthodoxy as central claims of a religion
The distinction between orthodoxy and heresy, of course, requires more than
just supposing that some beliefs pertaining to a religion are true and others
aren't. Another presupposition of the distinction is the idea that religions can
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have an order or structure to them. The same point applies also to secular
worldviews. Among the claims included as true in a particular philosophical
or political position, some will be central to that position, constitutive of it,
and others will not. On this way of thinking about the matter, the claims that
constitute orthodoxy are the central, rather than the peripheral, claims of a
religion or worldview. Furthermore, people can be mistaken about what
these claims are. Not everything that anyone takes to be a central claim of a
religion or worldview really is central to it. Devout Muslims can be wrong
about what counts as a central claim for Islam, for example.
For present purposes, we can think of this understanding of a religion as
a matter of taking a religion doctrinally.
It is also possible, however, to take a religion or world view sociologically, in the sense that we take the religion or worldview to be whatever the
adherents of the religion at any time suppose it to be. l4 On this way of
understanding a religion, a devout Muslim couldn't be mistaken about
what the central claims of Islam are. They are what he thinks they are.
Our understanding of a worldview or religion will differ markedly
depending on which way we take it.
Suppose we ask, for example, whether Confucianism is compatible with
Buddhism. Our answer will vary depending on which way we take
Confucianism. If we take Confucianism sociologically to refer to all the
claims held as Confucian by those who took themselves to be Confucian,
then we are likely to suppose that the question whether Confucianism is
compatible with Buddhism can be answered only by historical or sociological research. Sociologically considered, those who took themselves to be
Confucians have frequently been favorably inclined towards Buddhism
and seen no conflict between Buddhism and their Confucianism. So, for
instance, in the eighteenth century, in the middle of the Ching period, the
Ch'ien-Iung emperor, who was strongly committed to Confucianism,
began each day with a devotion to the Buddha. ls On the other hand, not all
Confucians took such an attitude. Earlier, at the start of Manchu rule in the
middle of the seventeenth century, the literati argued that true
Confucianism required the rejection of Buddhism. On a sociological understanding of Confucianism, we can say only that Confucianism has been
sympathetic to Buddhism at some times and not at others. If we take
Confucianism in this way, we will have to hold that the seventeenth-century Confucians were confused or even just historically naive in taking
Confucianism to be incompatible with Buddhism.
But the seventeenth-century Confucians weren't historically naive. In
fact, it was precisely their historical knowledge that led them to take the
attitude they did; they thought that their Ming predecessors had declined
morally and lost the rule of the Empire in part because they had abandoned
true Confucianism for a syncretistic substitute. These seventeenth-century
Confucians were taking Confucianism doctrinally, rather than sociologically, and in their view Confucianism doctrinally understood required the
rejection of those Buddhist claims which had been assimilated to
Confucianism at the end of the Ming dynasty in the late sixteenth century.l6
Some contemporary scholars of religion reject the idea of taking a religion
or worldview doctrinally and suppose that there is no legitimate alternative
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to taking it sociologically.'7 But this position seems to me implausible.
Consider, for example, Maoist political theory. Among the claims associated with Maoist theory is the claim that revolutionary fervor declines in
old age; another Maoist claim is that in ChiI,a the main or most important
revolutionaries are peasants in rural areas. Those familiar with
Communism and twentieth-century China would, I think, take a Maoist
who denied the second of these claims to be holding a very unorthodox
Maoist position. An important part of what distinguishes Maoist from
Leninist political theory is the focus on the rural rather than the urban
underclass. A different judgment is called for, however, in the case of the
first claim. Even a very orthodox Maoist might part company with Mao on
that score. A Maoist who supposed that revolutionary fervor was just as
great in old people as in the young would not thereby be an unorthodox
Maoist. He might still suppose that perpetual revolution generated by
those in rural areas was necessary, but he would think it might be made by
revolutionaries of any age.
Accepting the legitimacy of the notion of orthodoxy requires supposing
that it is possible to take worldviews doctrinally and that some claims are
central to particular worldviews, doctrinally understood. The claim that
China's revolution is dependent on the rural peasantry is central to Mao's
version of Marxism, as the claim about revolutionary fervor's relation to
age is not. From a Maoist point of view, denial of either of these claims is
false; but only the denial of the one about the peasantry is unorthodox.
It's important to point out here that nothing in the view that some
claims are central to a worldview requires us to suppose that all the implications of those claims are always understood by the adherents of that
worldview, or even by the creator of it. So, for example, although Mao
always maintained that literature and the other arts must serve the needs
of the proletariat, it wasn't until the 1970's that he carne to see that some
works, such as the classic novel Water Margin, which various Maoists had
repudiated as tainted by feudal and Confucian values, could nonetheless
be thought of as serving the people because such works could be taken as
teaching by "negative example. illS This later position of Mao's allowed him
to continue to demand that literature be ancillary to Communist concerns
without requiring him also to jettison much that the Chinese had traditionally been proud of in their literary heritage. Given the great value Mao set
on Chinese culture and his demand that the arts serve the people, his claim
that the arts can teach by negative example is implicit in his original core
beliefs. Here there is an interval of decades only between the original core
claims and their later explicit elaboration. Some medieval Franciscans supposed that the interval might stretch to centuries.
The importance and usefulness of the view that only some claims
included as true in a worldview are central to it can be seen by considering
what can happen when we reject such a view. If we reject it, there is a danger that the denial of any of the claims included as true in a worldview will
seem equally as serious as the denial of any other.
For example, in the thirteenth century Peter John Olivi held as one of his
Christian beliefs the view that quantity is not something distinct from the
parts of a substance. This metaphysical view shapes his theory of the
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Eucharist. Called to account by the Church authorities for this theory, Olivi
defended himself by arguing that his claims about quantity were peripheral
rather than central to Christian doctrine and that therefore even if his claims
about quantity were false, they shouldn't cOlmt as heretical. He says,
I do not want to see those things which do not directly affect the articles of our faith treated or held as if they were themselves articles of
faith. Such things should rather be treated as ancillary to it. ... In
such matters no single opinion should be advanced as the faith, for
unless I am mistaken about such matters (which I do not believe)
dangers of the highest sort lurk in such an assertion .... '')
He seems to me entirely right here. The Church authorities of his day,
who were not as clear as they should have been on the distinction between
beliefs central to a world view and those peripheral to it, burned four
Franciscan spirituals at the stake in Marseilles in 1318 because they refused
to obey Church authorities about the length of Franciscan cloaks (among
other issues)?' Even if one of the competing claims about the right length of
Franciscan cloaks had been true, it seems the height of absurdity to suppose
that Christianity requires the acceptance of that claim or that failure to obey
Church authorities on this issue warrants death by burning. This sort of
absurdity didn't vanish with the Middle Ages. At Mao's death one of the
groups competing for power was called 'the Whatever Faction', because the
members of that group were corrunitted to maintaining as true, and compulsory for all Chinese to believe, anything Mao said, whatever it was.
H we accept the notion of orthodoxy and with it the recognition that not
all the claims included as true in a worldview are central to it, it becomes
easier to recognize the dreadful folly represented by the Whatever Faction
or the fourteenth-century Church authorities responsible for the Marseilles
burning.

Orthodoxy and pluralism
As I said at the outset, our awareness of and attitudes towards the great
plurality of religions and other worldviews has made some theologians
wary of claims of orthodoxy. Since the claims a particular religion maintains as orthodox are those the religion holds to be true and central, the
partisans of that religion in claiming orthodoxy for their views seem to
take a disrespectful attitude towards different beliefs held by their co-religionists and, by extension, towards all religions incompatible with their
own. Some theologians consequently suppose that claims of orthodoxy are
arrogant or even sinful. So, for example, Gordon Kaufman says,
If we try to overcome and control the mystery within which we
live-for example, through philosophical or theological ideas in
which we take ourselves to be in a position to present conclusive evidences and arguments, or through religious rituals or practices which
promise us a secure place in the ultimate scheme of things-we sin
against God ....2!
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Kaufman recommends instead "a certain agnosticism," a recognition that
religious matters are an "ultimate mystery.""
Now it is certainly true that a parochial focus on what is taken to be the
orthodoxy of one's own religion can lead a person to be arrogant or disrespectful to others. But it's not at all clear that simply maintaining some
beliefs as orthodox entails disrepect towards adherents of other views. As
I said in my first qualification, it is important to make a distinction between
attitudes towards persons and attitudes towards their beliefs. Respect and
sympathy are attitudes shown primarily towards persons and only secondarily or derivatively towards systems of belief. To say that one is in sympathy with Marxism, for example, is just to say that one is inclined to feel
about things as committed Marxists do, or that one can understand how
somebody in certain circumstances could come to believe what Marxists
believe. And an adherent of one world view could clearly feel respect for
an adherent of a different worldview without actually feeling about things
as the other does. Aquinas, for example, wasn't in the least tempted to
adopt Islam but nonetheless had enormous respect for Avicenna. To suppose that we can't respect persons with whose religious worldviews we
disagree is to make precisely the sort of mistake responsible for a great deal
of religious warfare.
Furthermore, if, contrary to what I've just argued, respect is a function
of sharing beliefs, then it isn't at all clear that an agnostic of the Kaufman
variety who rejects the notion of orthodoxy will tum out to be more
respectful of others than a proponent of the orthodoxy of a particular religion will be. Kaufman's agnosticism requires us to hold that all the claims
on the part of the world's major religions to know some religious truth are
not true. Even so parochial a medieval as Aquinas wouldn't have repudiated other religions so drastically. He, at any rate, supposes that Christians
share significant religious knowledge not only with Jews and Muslims but
even with polytheistic pagans. Unlike the agnostic of Kaufman's sort,
Aquinas is willing to suppose that adherents of non-Christian religions
know some religious truths. 21 So even if we tie respect to systems of belief
rather than persons, it's hard to see Kaufman's agnosticism as the more tolerant or respectful position here since such an agnostic has to reject many
more claims to know religious truth on the part of the adherents of some
religion than the non-agnostic adherents of other religions do.
Finally, it is worth noticing that in order to have a plurality of religions,
we have to have different groups which accept the notion of orthodoxy
and which suppose themselves to know at least some orthodox truths. The
distinctions among religions are in part a function of their differing understandings of what is to count as orthodox. The plurality of religions would
be at least significantly diminished if the differing groups all gave up any
claim to orthodoxy. In fact, we couldn't even have agnosticism if we abandoned the notion of orthodoxy. Like religious believers, the agnostic, too,
has some claims he takes to be true and central to his position-for example, the claim that we don't know the truth with regard to religion.
Someone who advertised himself as an agnostic but who rejected the claim
that we don't know religious truth would himself be rejected by the agnostics he was trying to associate with. In agnosticism, too, there is an ortho-
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doxy. Accepting the notion of orthodoxy therefore seems to be necessary
in order to have any coherent worldview at all.

Orthodoxy and heresy
One further preliminary point is helpful here. What is being opposed to
orthodoxy in this context is not unorthodoxy or even heterodoxy. It's
heresy, and heresy is a contrary, not a contradictory, opposite of orthodoxy. Something which is heretical isn't orthodox, and something which is
orthodox isn't heretical; but there can be many religious beliefs which are
neither orthodox nor heretical. We might suppose that heresy consists in
the rejection of any claim which a religion or worldview includes as both
true and central to it."4 But heresy is a complicated notion, and this characterization still hasn't got it quite right. Even for claims that are not only
included as true in but also central to a worldview, it isn't necessarily the
case that the rejection of one of them is tantamount to heresy. Aquinas, for
example, cites with approval a view held by Augustine, the great heresyfighter of his time: "By no means should we accuse of heresy those who,
however false and perverse their opinion may be, defend it without obstinate fervor, and seek the truth with careful anxiety, ready to mend their
opinion when they have found the truth." 25 And this holds, in Aquinas's
view, not only with regard to religious matters peripheral to faith, but also
with regard to claims that are central to the faith.
We must be careful not to let the quotation mislead us; Aquinas's opinions about heresy are more nearly like Mao's in the Hundred Flowers campaign than they are like those of liberal American academics. In Aquinas's
view, all it takes to count as defending a position with obstinate fervor or
failing to seek the truth with sufficient anxiety is standing against the
authority of the Roman Church. But what is interesting and worth noting
here is the distinction Aquinas makes between unorthodoxy-even in
claims he takes to be central to Christianity-and heresy. For a person's
belief to count as heresy he must also know that a certain position is one
held to be central by the Church and decide, nonetheless, to reject it. 26
If Aquinas is willing to be tolerant towards those who "seek the truth
with careful anxiety," why does he take so negative an attitude towards
those who go against the authority of the Church? Why couldn't those
who reject the Church's teachings also count as people who were seeking
the truth with careful anxiety and thinking that they'd found it, but elsewhere than among the Church's teachings?
The answer to these questions is not hard to see, I think. Aquinas supposes that in matters of theology as in all other areas of human thought
there is such a thing as expertise. And he takes the expertise of many generations of theological thinkers reflecting on revelation and tradition to be
expressed in the teachings of the Church, teachings which were built up
gradually through the labor and thought of many different minds over a
long period of time. To reject the teachings of the Church, then, is to suppose that one person has got right what generations of thinkers, operating
communally, have gotten wrong. For Aquinas, the determination of what
counts as orthodoxy sterns from the expertise vested in a community. To
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hold out for one's own opinion against the cumulative results of that community can seem sinfully proud.
I put this last point in a hedged way, because, unfortunately, it is clearly
the case that sometimes a whole community goes wrong. This is what
happened in the case of the Roman Catholic Church's opposition to Galileo
when the Church authorities as a group were convinced that orthodoxy
entailed a scientific position that, as it turned out, is false. 27 Furthermore, I
think-and, no doubt, you do, too-that in the history of Christianity this
is hardly the only occasion on which the whole community has gotten
something wrong (though perhaps we wouldn't have exactly the same list
of such occasions). What is orthodox is what is true and central to a worldview, but our determinations of what is to count as orthodox are included
in what we believe, and not always in what we know. Subsequent information or reflection may show us that we have to revise what we have
believed to be orthodox.
There is, therefore, a tension between granting that expertise in determinations of orthodoxy is vested in a community and recognizing that even
communities can go wrong.
Here I think there is one helpful point of analogy between a religious and
a scientific community."8 We speak disapprovingly of unorthodox medical
beliefs, for example, because we think-and quite correctly, too-that expertise in medicine is vested in the medical community as a whole and that
individuals choosing to reject a view held by the medical community at large
are highly likely to be not only wrong but pridefully, obstinately, wrong. So
in medicine we tend to be traditionalists, implicitly maintaining a position
analogous to Aquinas's position on heresy. On the other hand, however, we
know that occasionally the medical community as a whole is wrong and that
a lone unorthodox individual has a more nearly correct view. So, for example, the biologist who earlier in this century insisted that the Rous sarcoma, a
cancer found largely in chickens, was caused by a virus was hounded for
much of his career by the medical community for his unorthodox position.
The Rous sarcoma was agreed by all researchers to run in families and be
inheritable, and medical orthodoxy of the time held that no disease could be
both inheritable and also caused by a virus. But because of the efforts of that
supposedly unorthodox biologist, a major breakthough was made in our
understanding of cancer, and we now know that cancers can result from the
actions of genes and viruses simultaneously.
Even with our knowledge of such notable cases as that involving the
Rous sarcoma, however, most of us would still be inclined to side, most of
the time, with the general consensus of the medical community in its pronouncements about disease. That is, when it comes to medicine, most of us
are still disposed to accept that expertise is vested in the medical community as a whole. And this is a sensible position. It is much more likely that
the cumulative results of the labors of a whole community be right than
that any individual operating on his own outside that community could do
better.
And if this seems generally right as regards medicine, then perhaps,
with additional caveats for the effects of passion in religion, a similar attitude is appropriate in religion. In fact, there is more reason for adopting
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such an attitude with regard to Christianity than medicine. If there is a
long-established Christian consensus that some claim is true and central to
Christianity, and you (or you and your little group) in the late twentieth
century have discovered that it is false, then we have to wonder about the
providence of God, who let so many generations of Christians be deceived
about an important matter of faith. 2" And we may equally wonder what it
is about you (or your group) that this truth should be revealed to you
although it wasn't revealed to many Christians before you, at least some of
whom were conceivably smarter, better in character, or stronger in faith
than you.

The distinction between orthodoxy and heresy
So I think the distinction between orthodoxy and heresy is a good one
and worth preserving.
There is an objective fact of the matter with regard to religion, and some
religious statements, those which track that fact of the matter, are true.
Among the claims included as true in a worldview, some are central to that
worldview, taken doctrinally, and others are only peripheral to it. Those
which are included as true in a worldview and which are in fact central to
it constitute the orthodoxy of that worldview. 30
The plurality of religions in the world means that religious believers will
have differing views about what counts as orthodoxy in religion.
Nonetheless, rejection of the beliefs of religions other than one's own is compatible with great respect towards the adherents of those other religions.
Respect is an attitude shown primarily towards individuals, and only
derivately towards beliefs. But if respect were an attitude shown towards
systems of beliefs, too, then there would be more respect shown towards
other religions by a religiously orthodox adherent of the orthodoxy of one of
those religions than by those who reject the notion of orthodoxy altogether.
Not every unorthodox belief is heretical; more than the rejection of a
belief which is orthodox is required for heresy. For a belief to count as
heretical, it is also necessary that the person holding that belief recognize
that it has been rejected as unorthodox by a long-established consensus of
the accepted experts in the religious community.
Furthermore, it is sadly clear that the accepted experts can be wrong
about what counts as central to a religion, as well as what counts as true.
So while rejecting their consensus about orthodoxy is a necessary condition
for heresy, it isn't sufficient. One can reject the consensus and not hold a
heretical belief, if the consensus is mistaken about which of the beliefs
accepted as true by the religion are central to it. 31 Olivi's view on quantity
wasn't heretical even though it went against the consensus of medieval
theologians regarding Christian orthodoxy, because the negation of that
view, even if it were true, isn't central to Christianity.
On the other hand, although it is not guaranteed to be right, the cumulative consensus of a community of experts is more likely to be right than the
views of one individual (or one small group) alone. From the point of view
of Christianity, while it is possible that God would allow his church to be
deceived for centuries about what is true and central to faith, leaving the
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truth to be discovered by a lone individual or his group in the twentieth
century, the thought that God has actually done so isn't one that we should
arrive at lightly.
There are a great many other issues that need to be addressed in order
really to understand the nature of the distinction between orthodoxy and
heresy. For example, we'd need to ask how long a consensus has to be in
place before it counts as long-established. We'd need to know how to tell
the experts from those who think they're experts but aren't. Is expertise a
matter of education and training? Or is it instead a matter of saintliness? Or
are both required? Or is it even possible to tell who the experts are without
a kind of vicious circularity? If virtuous and well-educated Donatists disagree with the rest of the Christian world, we don't conclude that there is
no consensus; rather, we discount Donatist views as heresy. But then it
seems as if we have to know what counts as orthodoxy before we can tell
whom to include among the experts. Or, to look at the same problem from
a somewhat different angle, what about all the internal lack of consensus
on apparently crucial matters? The wars of religion weren't fought over
nothing, even if it sometimes looks that way. What happens to orthodoxy
if there is no consensus? And there are other questions as well.
Nonetheless, I think that this is enough for my purposes here. I need to get
just clear enough about the distinction between orthodoxy and heresy to
articulate my thesis about it, to which I want finally to tum.

The thesis: advice to Christian philosophers
I think contemporary Christian philosophers should reflect on the distinction between orthodoxy and heresy. They should do so not in order to
police their ranks, trying to weed out or put pressure on the heretics. As I
said at the beginning, the notion of a heretic is not a useful one, and it is
pernicious in the extreme to try to promote orthodoxy through political
pressure of any sort. In my view, contemporary Christian philosophers
should think about orthodoxy and heresy not in order to take the mote out
of somebody else's work and thought but in order to ask themselves
whether there is any beam in their own.
For this purpose, I think that Christian philosophers should be willing
to put some time and effort into learning about the history of Christian philosophy and theology. Whatever the difficulties of determining the experts
and their agreements, they're considerably magnified by ignorance of the
historical tradition.
And then I think that we should care if we find ourselves disagreeing
with that tradition, or even with some large or important part of iU2
So my thesis is simple. Christian philosophers should know enough
about their tradition to have some idea when they are at odds with it; and
when they are at odds with it, or some significant part of it, they should care.

The third qualification
Somebody might suppose that I'm recommending a reactionary, hidebound, slavish deference to religious tradition, which would impede all
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progress in philosophical theology and its related disciplines. But this isn't
quite right.
If we were to give up views that we have arrived at by seeking what
seems to us the truth in matters of religion just because those views disagreed with the tradition, then we'd be doing to ourselves what I said was
pernicious to do to others. If it's pernicious to bring political pressure, or
even peer pressure, to bear on someone to get him to adopt certain beliefs,
it's equally destructive to love of truth to let ourselves be pressured by tradition into accepting beliefs that go contrary to what earnest, hard-working
seeking for truth leads us to believe must be the case.
So if we find that the beliefs we have laboriously and carefully acquired
go contrary to the tradition, or some large part of the tradition, I think we
must hold on to our views. Even if it were possible to will to give up beliefs
in this sort of way, to give up our beliefs in deference to the tradition
would be a Pyrrhic victory for the tradition, as the whole sad history of
politics and Christian belief shows. In this fallen world, love of truth is
more precious than success in getting religious doctrine right, however
important right religious doctrine is.

Conclusion and consolation
On the other hand, although, as I said above, the experts have been
wrong in the past, when we disagree with the tradition, or some significant
part of it, there is another possibility which we ought to take seriously. It
might be that what has been responsible for beliefs of ours that are at odds
with the tradition is not just a laborious, earnest process on our part of seeking for the truth. Perhaps stupidity also came into it. Perhaps there was ignorance or obliviousness or any of a number of other non-culpable epistemic
faults. 33 Or maybe there were even culpable faults. Maybe there was carelessness, inattention, or neglect. It's also not outside the realm of possibility that
pride, willfulness, or even perversity played some very small role.
Even if we must not give up our beliefs in deference to the tradition in
such cases, then, I think we should care about our disagreement with the
tradition. Love of truth isn't compatible with blind obedience to tradition,
but it is compatible with wondering whether our efforts at finding truth
have been (non-culpably) inadequate or even marred by sin.
So besides historical literacy in the Christian tradition, I'm recommending care and worry when we disagree with it-care and worry, but not
guilt. Just as Mao thought that the feudal literature of an earlier period
could serve the proletariat by "negative example," so Augustine thought
that heretics performed a valuable service for the church. 34 The church
would never search out so zealously the understanding that supports faith,
Augustine thought, if it weren't driven to do so by the need to answer
heretics. So if in spite of our best efforts to find the truth in matters of religion we fall into heresy, we have that best of Protestant consolations: we
will still be useful,35
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